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In Beijing, the city’s government is investing to improve local infrastructure.  Over the last 
ten years, the government has constructed new subways and built the Olympic Park, which played 
a pivotal role in the 2008 Summer Olympics.  These investments have cost billions of dollars. 
Four new subway lines were built during 2000 to 2009, with the total investment of 50.3 billion 
RMB. 20.5 billion RMB was spent to construct the 2008 Olympic Park between 2003 and 2008.
1 
These place based investments have been concentrated in some of the less desirable areas of 
Beijing.   
In this paper, we use unique data to study how developers and restaurant entrepreneurs 
respond to this change in the quality of specific areas within Beijing.  We test whether public 
investments and private sector investments are complements that act synergistically to gentrify 
previously depressed areas within this booming city.         
Our investigation of the real estate market consequences from place based investments in a 
fast growing developing city contribute to a recent U.S literature focused on urban gentrification.    
Guerrieri, Hartley and Hurst (2010) document spatial spillovers such that exogenous increases in 
income in one community bid up real estate prices in adjacent communities.  Kahn (2007) 
documents the increase in local home prices in major U.S cities such as Boston and Washington 
DC that have opened “walk and ride” subway stops for fast new subways.      Schwartz, Susin and 
Voicu (2003) estimate how crime reduction differences within New York City have contributed to 
local real estate price appreciation.  Kahn, Vaughn and Zasloff (2010) report evidence of 
gentrification in Los Angeles communities that lie just inside the California coastal boundary zone.   
Sieg et. al (2004) show that an unintended consequence of successful Clean Air Act regulation in 
Los Angeles has been to trigger migration and gentrification in previously poor areas of the city 
whose air pollution has sharply decreased.         
In many of these cases, a government financed or regulated place based amenity 
improvement triggers a social multiplier effect in specific parts of a city.  The government’s 
investment has a direct effect of improving the local area’s quality of life. This is capitalized into 
higher rents.    As gentrification takes place, the local area will self select people who can afford to 
                                                               
1  The official exchange rate is 7 RMB per dollar. pay this rent premium.  A type of snowball effect ensues as the gentrification of the 
neighborhood attracts better stores and restaurants and this in turn attracts more high skilled 
people to live nearby (Waldfgoel 2008).       
This paper documents that similar dynamics are taking place in those Beijing areas where the 
state has made significant investments.  Using several new data sets, we report three new facts. 
First, homes near the new government infrastructure sell for a price premium.  Second, 
developers are increasing the number of housing units produced in a vicinity of this infrastructure.   
Third, new restaurant openings have also increased in the neighborhoods close to the Olympic 
Village and the new subways.  These findings all support the claim that public investment and 
private investment are complements.   
 
Recent Local Infrastructure Improvements in Beijing 
 
The two largest local infrastructure improvement projects that have taken place recently in 
Beijing are the construction of new subway lines and the development of the 2008 Olympic Park. 
Four new subway lines were built between 2000 to 2009 (Lines No. 4, 5, 10 and 13), which cost 
$50.3 billion RMB. The construction of the 2008 Olympic Park started in 2003 and was 
completed in 2008, with the total investment of 20.5 billion RMB. The Olympic Park occupies 
11.57 square kilometers and 73% of it is green space so it added a major green amenity to 
Beijing.
2  Figure One displays the locations of the Olympic Park and the four new subway lines.
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**** Insert Figure One about here **** 
 
                                                               
2  Carlino and Coulson (2004, 2006) use cross-city hedonic techniques to document that attracting a NFL team to a 
city raises local housing prices.    Our estimates of the impact of the Olympic Village on local home prices reflects 
an analogous localized treatment.    Unlike a sports stadium, the Olympic Village offers a bundle of increased 
green space and access to new infrastructure for holding large capacity events.   
3  According to China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook (2001-2009), there were three major local 
infrastructure improvement projects which cost over 10 billion in Beijing: construction of new subway lines (50.3 
billion), 2008 Olympic Park (20.5 billion) and Beijing Capital Airport Terminal 3 (25 billion). The Airport 
Terminal 3 is far away from Beijing’s urban area. So we choose to study the first two key public investments in 
Beijing. These spatial investments were not chosen at random.
4   To  better  understand  the  sitting  process, 
it is necessary to provide some details about Beijing’s governance structure.  The administrative 
system has three levels: Beijing municipality, district and Jiedao (Jiedao is referred to as zone 
thereafter in this paper).  While the Beijing Administrative Area consists of eighteen districts, 
both the municipal government and the public regard the inner eight districts (Dongcheng, 
Xicheng, Chongwen, Xuanwu, Chaoyang, Haidian, Fengtai, Shijingshan) as the urbanized area or 
“Beijing Metropolitan Area” (BMA), which is the spatial range we examine in this paper. BMA 
has an area of 1368 square kilometers.
5  Beijing is a monocentric city with key government 
functions and cultural opportunities available at the City Center. The CBD (TianAnMen Square 
and JianGuoMenWai Avenue) dominates the spatial distributions of population, land price and 
home price (Zheng and Kahn, 2008). There are four ring roads in BMA from the inner to the outer 
city—the second, third, fourth and fifth ring roads, respectively (See the bold circles in Figure 
One). Within the BMA, 135 Jiedaos (zones) exist as the fundamental administrative organization 
(the average size of each Jiedao is about 10 square kilometers).    Unlike the United States, which 
has a highly decentralized public goods provision system, public infrastructure and services are 
provided by the Beijing municipal government.  Services such as transportation, education and 
healthcare are provided at this level.    The Jiedao (zones) are only responsible for street cleaning, 
distributing subsidies to low-income households and enforcing the “one-child” policy. Jiedao is 
not responsible for infrastructure construction and public service provision. Therefore, the 
locational choice of local public investments is a centralized decision made by the municipal 
government. In this sense, the zone in this paper is like a U. S. census tract, which is a 
geographical unit of analysis that allows for research and data collection but not a political actor 
using tax revenue to provide public services. 
To investigate the motivations behind Beijing municipal government’s place based public 
investment decisions, we searched old documents and media reports, as well as interviewed 
relevant government officials. The Government chose to locate the 2008 Olympic Park outside of 
and adjacent to the North 4
th Ring Road
6, close to the 1990 Asian Games Village which was 
                                                               
4  Below, we will examine pre-treatment trends across the city.     
5  Data source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook 2010. 
6  This media report offers an example: http://house.focus.cn/news/2000-03-23/4579.html   located inside of the North 4
th Ring Road. The Asian Games Village area had developed into a city 
subcenter with office buildings, shopping places and new residential communities before the 
Olympic Park was built. The Government had a dual goal for this location decision. The first, of 
course, was to ensure a successful Olympic Games.  The Government favored the place that 
already had good existing infrastructure as well as a large green space. The existing sports 
facilities built at the time of the 1990 Asian Games could also be taken advantage of. The second 
goal was to further gentrify this area. The Zhongguancun  (IT) subcenter is not far away. By 
constructing the 2008 Olympic Park, the Government aimed to further gentrify this area to be a 
larger subcenter with high-skilled industries and high quality of living. 
When deciding where to build the subway lines, the Government considered several factors. 
The first was to mitigate current road congestion or to meet the anticipated ridership growth 
(especially for the subway stops in and around the city core).
7  The Beijing Municipal Government 
regarded subway construction as basic infrastructure provision intended to nudge growth to the 
previously under-developed areas. The history of urban development in Beijing left an important 
urban form legacy—North Beijing where most of government branches, universities and schools 
are located is more developed and richer than South Beijing.  The Beijing Municipal 
Government aims to promote the development in South Beijing by investing in more 
infrastructure projects there and restructuring the industry mix.
8  Building more subway lines there 
is one of the key stimulus policies.
9  New subway lines also extend to surrounding satellite towns 
to support their development.   
 
New Residential Construction in Beijing 
 
Over the last ten years in the Beijing Metropolitan Area (built-up area), 80 to 100 thousand 
units of new commodity housing have been built each year. New housing units are constructed and 
sold by real estate developers. A typical residential project developed by a developer always 
                                                               
7  For instance, the Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning recently declared that subway line 6 and line 
7 will be constructed to cope with the ridership growth of subway line 1 and the road congestion around the 
Beijing West Railway Station. 
8 See  http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2010-01/30/content_512648.htm   
9 See  http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-02/28/content_7686576.htm and   
http://finance.ifeng.com/roll/20101215/3058359.shtml   contains a couple of towers and hundreds or even thousands of housing units.   
We study the spatial distribution of new housing construction using data on new commodity 
housing sales in Beijing from the first quarter in 2006 through the fourth quarter in 2008. The unit 
of observation in this dataset is a housing unit, with an average floor-area of 148 square meters. 
There are altogether 1,596 projects and about 232 thousand units in our dataset. Table One 
provides descriptive statistics. The price for such newly-built commodity housing is high and has 
been surging for about seven years in Beijing. The total value of an average housing unit in our 
sample is 1,442 thousand RMB (220 thousand USD), which is 21 times the average annual 
household income in 2006 Beijing
10.  The upper middle class and the wealthy (both Beijing 
locals and the rich from other cities or aboard) tend to buy those new commodity housing units. 
Therefore the construction of new commodity housing projects does provide evidence of 
gentrification. 
This micro transaction dataset is not available to the public. We have a long-term 
collaborative relationship with Beijing Municipal Housing Authority, which helps us to obtain this 
valuable data set. We acknowledge that this time period is relatively short but we are unable to 
extend it to earlier years, because the transaction data for the years before 2006 are in paper form.   
We are not able to convert them into electronic form.  Our data set does cover the time period 
when there was considerable new housing construction and the time period when the Olympic 
Park and the new subways were being built.       
In this paper, the unit of analysis for the home price hedonic regressions is a housing unit, 
while the unit of analysis for the quantity regressions is a zone. We geocoded all housing unit sales 
on a Beijing GIS map. From the GIS map (Figure One) we can see that the majority of new 
residential construction takes place between the third ring road and the fourth ring road. There is 
little new construction inside the second ring road (the most inner ring road) where places are well 
developed and the redevelopment cost is very high. There is also less new construction in the 
places outside the fifth ring road since such remote locations are under-developed with short 
supply of infrastructure and public services. We run a simple OLS regression of zone-level 
development density (the units of new construction per square kilometer, in logarithm) on the 
distance to CBD and its quadratic term, and find a clear reverse-U shape relationship: 
                                                               
10  Data source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook 2007.  
  Log(Development Density) = 2.064 + 0.123*D_CBD – 0.008*D_CBD
2 
                        ( 1 0 . 6 7 * * * )   ( 3 . 3 4 * * * )       ( - 5 . 3 0 * * * )            R
2=0.059 
 
The R square is relatively low, so there may be other spatial factors affecting the locations of new 
residential development. This paper studies the determinants of new residential construction by 
zone by quarter from 2006Q1 to 2008Q4.   
 
The Beijing Residential Development Process   
 
Urban land is owned by the state. In practice, the local (city) land bureau is responsible for 
the vast majority of allocations of land through auction sales of leasehold rights (70 years for 
residential land use). After the year 2004, leaseholds are, in principle, all sold at public auction. 
Henderson et. al. (2009) provide a detailed background of China’s urban land market and the 
institutional arrangements of auction sales of leasehold rights. They find evidences showing that 
corruption may exist in land auction process. Corruption is not the focus of our paper, but we test 
if our data supports Henderson et. al. ’s argument. 
Developers incur costs through buying land leasehold right from local government and 
constructing and operating the building. The costs of building materials and labor can be regarded 
as constant across space within Beijing. We have a third geo-coded micro data set of recent 
residential land auctions to recover the hedonic cost per unit of land throughout the city. Our land 
data set includes 86 land parcels which were auctioned during 2005-2008. Figure Two shows the 
distribution of these land parcels in Beijing Metropolitan Area. 
Once developers have purchased the land leasehold right, they engage in contracting the 
design and construction work to design companies and builders. In principle, developers cannot 
hold the vacant land in hand for longer than 2 years. But this “2-years rule” is sometimes violated 
by developers without effective penalty. They can start to pre-sale the units when the progress of 
on-site construction work reaches a certain threshold (in Beijing, only after the main structure is 
completed the developer can start presale, about 90% or so of the construction). 
 Distinguishing Private Developers from State Owned Enterprise Developers 
 
The new residential towers are produced by SOEs and private developers in Chinese cities.   
There are 577 private developers in our sample. The top ten biggest ones produce 17% of the total 
units built by private developers. We investigate whether SOE (State owned enterprise) developers 
and private developers respond to such public investment signals equally.   
In the commodity housing development sector, SOE developers and private developers 
compete with each other. In our sample, there are altogether 833 real estate developers, 30.7% of 
which are SOE developers. The average sale price and unit size of the units developed by SOE 
developers is 10,039 RMB per square meter and 156 square meters, and the averages produced by 
private developers are 10,233 RMB per square meter and 163 square meters. So they produce 
similar products. The two developer groups also compete in land auctions, and they face the same 
explicit labor costs and building material costs (for institutional background on land auction, see 
the next section). However, SOE developers may be implicitly subsidized since they face less 
uncertainty in forecasting future public infrastructure investment planning. They may also face 




The Empirical Framework and Results 
 
We have a three-fold empirical strategy.  First, we use hedonic techniques to examine 
whether local infrastructure improvements are capitalized in residential property price and land 
leasehold price (land price thereafter). At this step our unit of analysis is a residential property 
                                                               
11  SOEs have some privileges to resources and finance. The existing four largest banks in China are all 
state-owned. They are willing to lend their money to SOEs in various industries, including real estate development, 
because the banks think the risks are low -- those SOEs are too big to fail (Deng et. al., 2010). SOE developers 
also have close connections with the central or local governments (depending on it is a central SOE or a local 
SOE). They may be able to obtain internal information on public investment plans for infrastructure or urban 
planning details. They may also escape from being punished when violating the real estate development rules set 
by the government. For instance, they may be able to hold their vacant land in hand for longer than 2 years which 
violates the “2-years rule”, or increase the FAR limitation for a particular land parcel.   
 project by quarter or an auctioned land parcel.  Second, we estimate count level regression 
models to study the spatial distribution of new housing supply. Based on a revealed preference 
argument, these new housing unit count regressions establish which Beijing geographical areas are 
attractive locations to real estate developers. The unit of analysis in this case is a zone.
12  Third, 
we use restaurant data to estimate count regressions. In a similar spirit as Waldfogel (2008), we 
test whether restaurant counts increase in the vicinity of the new Olympic Village and new 
subways.      To preview our results, we find that the new government infrastructure is capitalized 
into sales prices. The count of new housing and new restaurants increases in a vicinity around the 
new Olympic Village and new subways. 
 
 
Home Price and Land Price Hedonics 
 
We estimate two sets of hedonic regressions. One set is home price hedonics and the other is 
land price hedonics. We are especially interested in the capitalization effects of the new 
infrastructure projects; namely the Olympic Park and the new subways (see Table A3 in the 
Appendix for the event dates of the Olympic Park and new subway lines). 
 
**** Insert Table Two about here **** 
 
The home price regressions are presented in Table Two. Each project has many housing units. The 
sale of a project may last several quarters, and for each quarter, many housing units in that project 
are sold. The unit of analysis is the average sale price for each project for each quarter. We include 
zone fixed effects in the equation to control for the effects of existing public goods such as schools 
and local green parks. In Column (1), we find a significant negative price gradient with respective 
to the distance from CBD, and the size of this negative gradient (-0.019) is the same with that in 
our earlier study (see Zheng and Kahn, 2008). In Column (2) we include the residential project’s 
distance to the closest old subway stop. There are two old subway lines built prior to 2000 in 
                                                               
12  We assume that each developer viewing himself as “small” takes these hedonic gradients as given and chooses 
where and how much to construct. Beijing, and the areas around these stops are well-developed business clusters. As expected, places 
near old subway stops have higher home prices. We notice that after including the distance to old 
subway stop,    the CBD gradient variable becomes insignificant.    These two distance measures 
are highly correlated.     
In Column (3) we include the residential project’s distance to the 2008 Olympic Park and its 
distance to the closest new subway stop. The latter distance has two versions: D_NEWSUB_S 
refers to the start effect, while D_NEWSUB_C refers to the completion effect. The constructions 
of the four new subway lines had already been started before our study period, so D_NEWSUB_S 
is a static variable. D_NEWSUB_C is a dynamic variable—during our study period, when the 
construction of a new subway line was completed, this variable changes thereafter
13. Through this 
way, we are able to test whether prices adjust before the infrastructure is put into use
14. We find 
that the construction start effect is quite significant and the size is large. Home price decreases by 
0.6% when its distance to the closest new subway stop increases by 10%. This means that the 
capitalization effect takes place immediately after the news of new subway line construction is 
started. Since the construction of the 2008 Olympic Park took a relatively long time period, we 
interact the log of this distance variable with a linear time trend variable to capture the gradually 
increasing effect. This interaction term is also significantly negative, showing that home prices 
near the Olympic Park have been growing. In Column (3) we substitute the subway start variable 
(D_NEWSUB_S) with the completion variable (D_NEWSUB_C). The completion effect becomes 
smaller.  
We recognize that we are attributing all of the post-treatment variation to the construction of 
the Olympic Park and the new subways.    To substantiate our claim, we construct a few control 
groups.
15    The Beijing municipal government has put forward a series of subway construction 
strategy plans. According to these plans, 20 new lines will be built during 2000 to 2020 and the 
total mileage will reach over 1,000 kilometers. In those strategy plans the exact locations and 
                                                               
13  For instance, in 2006, a certain residential project’s D_SUB_C is the minimum value of all the distances from 
this project to existing subway stops. After subway line 5 was completed in 2007, this distance variable will be 
replaced by the minimum value of all the distances to existing stops plus line 5 stops. If this project is close to one 
of the line 5 stops, this distance variable will decrease. 
14  We are unable to test the announcement effect separately because the announcements and starts of the four lines 
were both before our study period. 
15  Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) offer the most compelling case control study of the causal effects of 
local investments. They compare the ex-post outcomes for areas that attracted an industrial production plant to 
other areas who were the “runner up” in attracting the plant but lost. construction dates of the proposed new subway lines are ambiguous. Till 2008, the four lines we 
study had been constructed, and the locations of the other 2 lines had been announced (Line 6 and 
Line 7), but the exact construction time of the latter 2 lines is uncertain. Therefore the 2 un-built 
subway lines provide us a control group. We create a new distance variable (D_UNBUILT_SUBh) 
measuring each residential project’s distance to the closest un-built subway stop. We find that for 
the places where the government intends to build new subway lines, only those where the real 
construction has been started experience home price appreciation. A possible explanation for this 
insignificant announcement effect is that the Beijing municipal government does not have a clear 
timetable for its subway construction strategy plan, and the proposed rough timetable is always 
changing. Therefore even the subway line locations are announced, it is still uncertain concerning 
when the lines will be built. 
In all of the regressions we control for whether the residential project is built by a SOE 
developer. Holding other factors constant, SOE sell their commodity housing units at a price 
discount but this discount is insignificant.   
 
**** Insert Table Three about here **** 
 
There are two auction types in China’s urban land auction market—listing ("two stage 
auction") and bidding (regular English auction).
16    In the land price hedonic regressions reported 
in Table Three, the unit of analysis is a land parcel sale. Since the sample size is small, we are 
unable to include zone fixed effects. We include the fixed effects of the land parcel’s physical 
condition when it is auctioned (the connections to basic public infrastructure facilities, such as 
water, road, electricity, etc. There is a ranking of four levels, so three dummies are included). In 
Column (1) and (2), we find that the price gradient’s distance to CBD elasticity is much steeper 
                                                               
16  Cai et. al. (2009) argue that in theory the latter type would most likely maximize sales revenue for “cold” 
properties with fewer bidders. But listing auction is more corruptible, so city officials intend to divert hotter 
properties to this form. They find the corruption evidence by comparing the “hotness” and prices of the land 
parcels under these two auction forms.    In our sample we compare the two groups’ average distances to CBD, 
subway stops and the Olympic Park. We find that the listing land parcels do locate in better locations. Our land 
price regressions also show that the listing land parcels are slightly cheaper than bidding ones though the effect is 
insignificant. 
 than what we estimated in the housing price hedonic.    Proximity to old subway stops is 
capitalized into land prices.    In Column (3) we include the two new infrastructure improvement 
variables. The Olympic Park variable is marginally significant but the new subway (start) variable 
is insignificant. Recognizing that we do not know when market prices reflect information, in 
column (4) we change the definition of the “new subway” indicator from the start measure to the 
completion  measure.  This  variable’s  coefficient is significantly negative. Land price decreases 
by 1.4% when its distance to the closest subway stop increases by 10%. It seems that land prices 
respond to public amenity investments more slowly than home prices. In Column (5) we also 
include the control variable (D_UNBUILT_SUBl) and it is insignificant.      The construction of 
new subway lines does trigger the appreciations of land prices and home prices nearby.    In all of 
these regressions we control for SOE and auction type. SOE buy land leaseholds at slightly (but 
not significantly) higher prices.   
 
Gentrification Evidence Based on New Housing Construction 
 
We now test whether developers are building new housing near the new infrastructure sites. 
Such new housing is expensive and is bought by the upper-middle class and the wealthy. 
Therefore, by tracking where new commodity housing projects are developed we are able to 
identify the gentrified areas with increasing purchasing power.   
Tables Four and Five reports the results of the quantity regression by zone/quarter.  Table 
Four reports the results using OLS while Table Five reports the results using a negative binomial 
count model.    We control for quarter fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by zone. We 
include the distance to CBD (D_CBDz) and its interaction with linear time trend to test the 
suburbanization effect. In Column (1) and (2) all residential property units are counted. Column (3) 
and (4) only count the projects developed by SOE developers; while Column (5) and (6) count that 
by non-SOE developers, to see if there are any differences between the development location 
decisions by those two developer types. In Column (1), the two variables of new infrastructure 
improvements (log(D_OLYPMICz)*TIME_Q, log(D_NEWSUB_Sz)) are both significant. In 
Column (2) we substitute D_NEWSUB_Sz (start) with D_NEWSUB_Cz (completion), and the latter 
has a larger effect and is more significant. So the construction activity response may lag the price response to new infrastructure improvements. The above evidence supports the claim that the 
public infrastructure is triggering a gentrification process as more new commodity housing 
construction emerges near the Olympic Park and along the four new subway lines. If a zone's 
distance to the closest new subway stop (construction completed) increases by 10%, the number 
of  sales in the zone drops by 4.3%.  Little new residential construction takes place near old 
subway stops, and the significantly negative interaction term of D_CBDz*TIME shows that as time 
goes on, more and more new housing units are built further away from the city center.
17 This  may 
be due to the fact that land is much scarcer and redevelopment cost is high around the city center 
and the old subway stops. The control group variable’s coefficient (log(D_UNBUILT_SUBz)) is 
also statistically insignificant.   
We divide the sales to SOE-developed ones and non-SOE-developed ones and run separate 
quantity regressions. SOE developers respond to public infrastructure investments more 
sensitively.  The coefficient of the Olympic Park distance variable is larger for SOEs than that 
for non-SOEs. The coefficient of new subway distance variable (completion) is significant for 
SOEs but not for non-SOEs.  SOEs have an advantage of obtaining the internal information of 
the exact locations of new infrastructure investments ahead of time due to their close relationships 
with government bureaus, so they are able to respond to such new infrastructure investment 
projects faster than their counterparts in the private sector.
18 
 
**** Insert Table Four about here **** 
**** Insert Table Five about here **** 
 
                                                               
17  We interact the distance from CBD variable with quadrant dummies to allow the distance gradient to vary 
within Beijing. 
18  SOEs are likely to have an information advantage in deciding where they invest because of their “insider” 
relationship with government  bureaus.  In  theory  the  construction  plan of such huge infrastructure projects 
(timetable and exact sites) should be clearly listed in the master plan which should be released to the public. So it 
should be a public knowledge. However, in this fast-growing economy, the urban development and redevelopment 
activities are rapidly and intensively booming. The city government and its urban planners are unable to make a 
long-term and clear infrastructure investment plan.    It is possible that in some cases, SOE developers are able to 
have better information or obtain the internal information earlier than private developers because the former group 
may have closer connections with the local government.   
   
Gentrification Evidence Based on Chain Restaurant Openings 
 
New Restaurant Openings in Beijing 
 
We examine the spatial distribution of locally available restaurants (a typical type of local 
private goods) and its change over time within Beijing. The restaurant industry provides a good 
indicator of residential sorting and gentrification.    If more people are moving into an area and if 
they are richer than the average person, then we will expect to see the count and quality of 
restaurants to rise over time in the “treated” areas.    Similar to Glaeser et. al.’s (2001) work on the 
rise of the “Consumer City”, we envision the growth of “Consumer Neighborhoods” near the new 
public infrastructure.     
Since no systematic data on restaurant cuisine and patronage exists in Beijing, we have to 
construct our own indicators. We identify the restaurant chains that fit the preferences (taste, 
service quality and price) of the upper-middle class and the wealthy who can afford new 
commodity housing. We interviewed 20 representative households in 5 new commodity housing 
communities to get a list of 33 chains they favor (11 western-cuisine ones and 22 Chinese-cuisine 
ones, see Table A1 in the Appendix for a list of these chains). These chains account for 42.8% of 
all restaurant chains operating in Beijing.  We used the most famous food guide and review 
website www.dianping.com to collect the location and opening date information for all the 902 
establishments of these 33 chains.    We geocoded the locations and mapped them.    Figure Three 
displays the data. The market for chain restaurants in Beijing has been growing quickly. There 
were only 303 establishments by the end of 2005, but at the end of 2008 this number tripled. We 
further compute the number of existing restaurants (as a stock variable) and new restaurants (as a 
flow variable) by zone/year. The zone-level correlation coefficient of new restaurants and 
newly-built commodity housing units sold is 0.21.   
Tables Six and Seven reports the results of the restaurant quantity regressions by zone/quarter.   
Table Six reports the results using OLS while Table Seven reports the results using a negative 
binomial count model.      Chain restaurant openings follow the same spatial patterns as that of 
new commodity housing construction—more restaurants opened around the Olympic Park and new subway stops. In Column (1), if a zone's distance from the closest new subway 
stop (completion) increases by 10%, the annual number of chain restaurant openings in the zone 
drops by 2.0%. In Column (2) this effect is even larger (2.4%) when we substitute the subway 
completion variable with construction start variable, which supports our gentrification hypothesis.   
We also find that new chain restaurants are opening near existing subway stops. In Column (3) we 
include additional control variables and they are statistically insignificant. The interaction term of 
D_CBD*TIME shows that chain restaurants are also suburbanizing.   
 
**** Insert Table Six about here **** 




  Government infrastructure projects can have dramatic effects on local real estate markets.   
Whether the example is Boston’s Big Dig or the possibility of a Subway to the Sea in Los Angeles, 
such major public projects have been shown to stimulate spatially targeted private investments.   
This paper has documented that the same dynamic plays out in Beijing. 
  As the city government invested in the Olympic Village and in new subways, local home 
prices increased, developers increased their construction and more restaurants of higher quality 
opened nearby.    All three of these pieces of evidence support the claim that government 
investment and private sector investment are complements that work together to gentrify 
previously under-developed areas.     
But, gentrification is not a “free lunch”.    The urban poor are likely to be displaced from land 
whose value has increased. We do observe that, at the places where infrastructure improvement 
and new real estate development are taking place in Beijing, the homes of poor people, such as 
rural migrants, are demolished and they are pushed further out to the remote suburban areas. 
Those poor people do not leave Beijing because they can find jobs here, but they have to commute 
longer distances from the city fringe to work places. To mitigate this problem, the Beijing 
municipal government has built a limited number of public affordable housing projects near suburban subway stops. But only the poor households with Beijing local hukou permits are 
eligible to live in such subsidized public housing. 
  We do not know if our results will generalize to smaller Chinese cities.  Some mayors of 
small cities in China have ambitions to build major infrastructure projects such as huge town 
squares.  The causal effects of such investments are unclear.  Will such investments slow 
out-migration or accelerate in migration?   References 
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Figure Three:    Chain Restaurants in Beijing 
 Table One: Variable definitions and summary statistics 
 
1.  Project/parcel level 
Variable Definition  Period  Obs.  Mean Std.dev.




D_CBDh  A residential project’s distance to CBD, in km, static variable.    1596  10.456 5.271 
D_OLYMPICh  A residential project’s distance to Olympic Park, in km, static variable.    1596  12.553 5.559 
D_NEWSUB_Sh 
A residential project’s distance to the closest new subway stop (construction started), dynamic 
variable.  2006q1-2008q4 
7091 3.716 3.620 
D_NEWSUB_Ch 
A residential project’s distance to the closest new subway stop (construction completed), 
dynamic variable.  2006q1-2008q4 
7091 6.126 4.585 
D_OLDSUBh  A residential project’s distance to closest old subway stops, static variable.    1596  4.610  3.582 
D_POTENTIAL_SU
Bh  A residential project’s distance to the closest potential subway stop, static variable.   
1596 4.749 4.197 
SOEh  Binary, 1=the residential project is developed by a SOE developer, 0=otherwise.    1596  0.449  0.498 
LN_LP  Log price of a land parcel (Yuan per square meter).  2005-2008  86  8.227  0.671 
D_CBDl  A land parcel’s distance to CBD, in km.    86  11.878 5.301 
D_OLYMPICl  A land parcel’s distance to Olympic Park, in km.    86  12.800 6.402 
D_NEWSUB_Sl  A land parcel’s distance to the closest new subway stop (construction started).  2005-2008  86  3.407  4.009 
D_NEWSUB_Cl  A land parcel’s distance to the closest new subway stop (construction completed).  2005-2008  86  5.783  5.031 
D_UNBUILT_SUBl  A land parcel’s distance to the closest unbuilt subway stop.    86  7.410  4.037 
D_OLDSUBl  A land parcel’s distance to the closest old subway stop.    86  5.644  3.475 
BIDDING  Binary, 1=the auction type of the land parcel is bidding, 0=otherwise.    86  0.471  0.502 SOEl  Binary, 1=the land parcel is bought by a SOE developer, 0=otherwise.    86  0.506  0.503 
 
2.  Zone level 
Variable Definition  Period  Obs. Mean Std.dev.
LN_UNITS    Log (the number of sale units+1), by zone/year    2006q1-2008q4 1620 3.028  2.369 
LN_RESTAURANT  Log (the number of restaurants opened+1) , by zone/year  2006-2010  675 0.551  0.654 
LN_AREA  Log zone size, in square km.    135 15.527 1.055 
D_CBDz  A zone’s distance to CBD, in km, static variable.    135 10.885  6.782 
D_OLYMPICz  A zone’s distance to Olympic Park, in km, static variable.    135 60.484 32.389 
D_NEWSUBz  A zone’s distance to the closest new subway stop (completed), dynamic variable.  2006q1-2008q4 675 8.162  0.982 
D_OLDSUBz  A zone’s distance to closest old subway stops, static variable.    135 8.036  0.997 
D_UNBUILT_SUBz  A zone’s distance to the closest unbuilt subway stop, static variable.    135 5.096 4.759 
Q1 
Binary,1=zone which locates in the first quadrant of Beijing (Tiananmen as the 
origin), 0=otherwise.   
135 0.274 0.446 
Q2  Binary,1=zone which locates in the second quadrant, 0=otherwise.    135 0.370  0.483 
Q3  Binary,1=zone which locates in the third quadrant, 0=otherwise.    135 0.178  0.382 
Q4  Binary,1=zone which locates in the fourth quadrant, 0=otherwise.    135 0.178  0.382 
3.  Time trend 
TIME_Q  Quarterly time trend, 2006q1-2008q4, =1,2,3,4,5,…,12.  2006q1-2008q4      
TIME_Y  Yearly time trend, 2005-2008, =1,2,3,4.  2005-2008       
 Table Two: Hedonic Home Price Regressions   
Dependent variable: LN_HP 
 
Dependent Variable  LN_HP LN_HP LN_HP LN_HP LN_HP 
Independent Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D_CBDh  -0.0186
*** -0.00101  0.00455  0.00104  0.00466 
  (-4.25) (-0.21) (0.93) (0.21) (0.91) 




     (-2.27)  (-2.21)  (-2.27) 
Log(D_NEWSUB_Sh)     -0.0657
***  -0.0658
*** 
     (-6.59)  (-6.58) 
Log(D_NEWSUB_Ch)      -0.0222
**  
      (-2.42)   





    (-8.58) (-8.22) (-8.47) (-8.22) 
Log(D_UNBUILT_SUBh)       -0.000754 
       (-0.07) 
SOEh  -0.00991  -0.0108  -0.00502 -0.00970 -0.00500 







 (193.77)  (89.55)  (81.41) (76.80) (67.49) 
Zone  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  7091 7091 7091 7091 7091 
R
2 0.486  0.492  0.495  0.492  0.495  
Table Three:    Hedonic Land Price Regressions   
Dependent variable: LN_LP 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
D_CBDl  -0.0314
** -0.0259
* -0.0146 -0.0202 -0.0225
* 
  (-2.49) (-1.89) (-1.08) (-1.56) (-1.74) 
Log(D_OLYMPICl)*TIME_Y     -0.0586
* -0.0367 -0.0247 
     (-1.94)  (-1.13)  (-0.75) 
Log(D_NEWSUB_Sl)     -0.0931    
     (-1.63)    
Log(D_NEWSUB_Cl)      -0.144
** -0.182
*** 
      (-2.36)  (-2.77) 
Log(D_OLD_SUBl)   -0.0668  -0.108
* -0.103 -0.147
** 
    (-1.01) (-1.69) (-1.65) (-2.15) 
Log(D_UNBUILT_SUBl)       0.126 
       (1.50) 
BIDDING  0.0729 0.0570 0.0492 0.0323 0.0291 
  (0.44) (0.35) (0.32) (0.21) (0.19) 
SOE  0.0937 0.104  0.130 0.0739  0.0728 







 (44.75)  (16.68)  (15.20) (15.35) (13.10) 
Land physical status (fixed 
effects) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  86 86 86 86 86 
R
2 0.418  0.426  0.502  0.521  0.536 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01  
Table Four     
New Commodity Housing Units Quantity Regressions   
Dependent variable: LN_UNITS by zone/quarter, standard errors clustered by zone 
 
  ALL SOE  NON-SOE 
















  (-3.67)  (-4.41)  (-3.92)  (-4.28)  (-3.33)  (-3.68) 
Log(D_NEWSUB_Sz)  -0.348
**    -0.142    -0.270   
  (-2.02)    (-0.73)    (-1.38)   
Log(D_NEWSUB_Cz)    -0.426
**    -0.424
**    -0.260 
    (-2.50)    (-2.40)    (-1.41) 
Log(D_OLDSUBz)  -0.0864 -0.0171  0.184  0.191  -0.123  -0.0634 
  (-0.41) (-0.09) (0.80) (0.91) (-0.61) (-0.34) 
Log(D_UNBUILT_SUBz)  -0.0848  -0.115 -0.105 -0.153 -0.110 -0.124 
  (-0.37) (-0.51) (-0.46) (-0.69) (-0.53) (-0.60) 
D_CBDz  -0.0195 -0.0687 -0.0317 -0.0411 -0.0243 -0.0654 
  (-0.22) (-0.83) (-0.34) (-0.51) (-0.28) (-0.89) 
D_CBDz*Q2  -0.0874 -0.0619 -0.0763 -0.0616 -0.0648 -0.0462 
  (-1.52) (-1.09) (-1.33) (-1.13) (-1.27) (-0.94) 
D_CBDz*Q3  -0.00648 0.0275  -0.0483 -0.0155  0.000189 0.0213 
  (-0.11) (0.46) (-0.83) (-0.26) (0.00) (0.40) 
D_CBDz*Q4  -0.0392 -0.0335 -0.0685 -0.0568 -0.0449 -0.0430 
  (-0.63) (-0.54) (-1.05) (-0.92) (-0.68) (-0.65) 
D_CBDz*TIME_Q  0.00300 0.00503
** 0.00324 0.00501
** 0.00268  0.00399 







 (-2.88)  (-2.46)  (-2.33)  (-1.60) (-2.50) (-2.38) 
Quarter  fixed  effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1620 1620 1620 1620 1620 1620 
R
2  0.262 0.268 0.177 0.194 0.210 0.210 
Joint F-test for D_CBD, 
D_CBD_Q2, D_CBD_Q3, 





t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01  
Table Five: New Commodity Housing Projects Regressions   
Dependent variable: SALE_UNITS by zone/quarter, standard errors clustered by zone 
 
  ALL SOE  NON-SOE 
















  (-3.57)  (-3.60)  (-1.75)  (-1.90)  (-6.39)  (-6.85) 
Log(D_NEWSUB_Sz)  -0.276
**    -0.194    -0.389
**   
  (-2.14)    (-1.31)    (-2.54)   
Log(D_NEWSUB_Cz)    -0.350
***    -0.407
***    -0.302
** 
    (-2.89)    (-2.64)    (-2.34) 
Log(D_OLDSUBz)  -0.00866 0.0234  0.0144 -0.0176  0.0837  0.171 
  (-0.05) (0.16) (0.06)  (-0.08) (0.54)  (1.16) 
Log(D_POTENTIAL_SUBz)  -0.0994 -0.128 0.0799  0.0598  -0.288  -0.268 
  (-0.72) (-0.95) (0.39) (0.29)  (-1.42)  (-1.39) 
D_CBDz  -0.0319 -0.0743  0.00433  -0.0188 -0.0927  -0.168
*** 




** -0.0142  0.0138 
  (-2.11) (-1.44) (-2.50)  (-2.22) (-0.41)  (0.42) 
D_CBDz*Q3  0.0169 0.0466  0.00307  0.0336 0.0172  0.0497 
  (0.49) (1.24) (0.06)  (0.61) (0.48)  (1.38) 
D_CBDz*Q4  -0.0402 -0.0347 -0.0776  -0.0672 -0.0248  -0.00988 
  (-1.17) (-1.08) (-1.43)  (-1.23) (-0.51)  (-0.22) 
D_CBDz*TIME_Q  0.00509
* 0.00651
** 0.00329 0.00440  0.00526
** 0.00761
*** 








 (-2.65)  (-2.13)  (-2.62)  (-1.86) (-4.00)  (-3.66) 
Quarter fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1620  1620  1620  1620  1620  1620 
z statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
The estimates report negative binomial regressions.  
Table Six: Chain Restaurant Openings Regressions 
Dependent variable: LN_RESTAURANT, by zone/quarter, standard errors clustered by zone. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 










  (-2.90)  (-6.21)  (-6.26) 
Log(D_NEWSUB_Sz)  -0.202
***     
  (-5.47)     
Log(D_NEWSUB_Cz)    -0.244
***  -0.254
*** 





  (-4.00) (-3.70) (-4.07) 
Log(D_UNBUILT_SUBz)     0.0572 





  (-1.91) (-4.37) (-4.33) 
D_CBDz*Q2  -0.00474 0.00151 -0.00123 
  (-0.61) (0.21) (-0.16) 
D_CBDz*Q3  -0.00169 0.00996 0.00637 





  (-2.26) (-1.79) (-2.04) 




  (2.75) (5.10) (5.13) 
Constant 0.695  1.323
** 1.129
* 
  (1.14) (2.18) (1.79) 
Observations 675  675  675 
R
2 0.236  0.273  0.276 





t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
  
Table Seven:   
Chain Restaurant Opening Regressions     
Dependent variable: RESTAURANT, by zone/quarter, standard errors clustered by zone. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 










  (-3.61)  (-6.81)  (-6.85) 
Log(D_NEWSUB_Sz)  -0.487
***     
  (-6.35)     
Log(D_NEWSUB_Cz)    -0.621
***  -0.633
*** 





  (-2.53) (-2.20) (-2.62) 
Log(D_POTENTIAL_SUBz)     0.107 





  (-3.54) (-5.69) (-5.66) 
D_CBDz*Q2  -0.0105 0.00619 0.00261 
  (-0.52) (0.31) (0.13) 
D_CBDz*Q3  -0.0120 0.0280 0.0208 





  (-2.46) (-2.12) (-2.26) 




  (2.94) (4.52) (4.48) 
Constant -2.518  -1.005 -1.393 
  (-1.40) (-0.59) (-0.81) 
Observations 675  675  675 
z statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
 
This table reports negative binomial regressions.  
Appendix 
 
Table A1 List of Chain Restaurants 
 
Western Chinese 
McDonald  Yang Fang hotpot  Dong Lai Shun 
KFC  Tian Wai Tian  Lu Lu restaurant 
ORIGUS Pizza  Lao Cheng Yi Guo  Chun Xia Qiu Dong hotpot 
Pizza Hut  Qingnian restaurant  Quanjude toast duck 
Subway  Ma La Xiang Guo  Wa Ha Ha 
Starbucks Coffee  Sanqianli steak  Qiao Jiang Nan 
UBC Coffee  Guo Lin restaurant  Wu Ming Ju 
Haagen-Dazs  Yonghe Dawang  Wan Long Zhou seafood 
TOKUGAWA  Hong Zhuang Yuan    Xiang Lin Tian Xia 
Yama Teppanyaki tricks  Xiabu Xiabu  Hei Song Bai Lu 
Wang Steak  Xiao Fei Yang  Pingrang Haitanghua 
 










171 132  303 
2006 58  63  121 
2007 72  55  127 
2008 116  235  351 
Total 417  485  902 
 
Table A3 The Event Dates for the Olympic Park and the New Subway Lines 
 
Project name  Start date  Completion date 
The Olympic Park  2002  2008 
Subway line 4  Before 2004  2009/2/11 
Subway line 5  Before 2002  2007/10/7 
Subway line 10  2004  2008/7/19 
Subway line 13  2000  2003/1/28 
Data source: http://zh.wikipedia.org 